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ABSTRACT
Using local authority planning in Dublin as a case sludy. the extent and effectiveness of
community and development interests' participation in policy formulation is examined. A
primary locus is on the nature and timing of participation as a determinant of the rclalive
influence that each can cxerl over policy decisions. A critical distinction is drawn between
formal and informal participation channels. The vast array of" informal channels available to
development interests can mean that they have little need to participate formally; thus a
primary and secondary layer of influence on policy formulation can be distinguished. The
primary layer is largely informal, on-going and pervasive. The secondary layer is formal,
controlled and capable only of adapting rather than formulating policy. This supports the
existence of an incontestable basis of planning policy that emerges from the primary layer
of influence and reflects an inherent acceptance of the legitimacy of development interests"
demands. As a consequence, questions are raised about the role of participation within a
planning system which functions in support of capital.
Key Index Words: Urban planning, policy formulation. Dublin.
Introduction
This paper contributes to a body of" literature that
positions urban planning as playing a crucial role
within the capitalist state apparatus. This role is (a) to
manage the built environment to avert crises in the
development process and (b) to ensure social cohesion
by creating a land use pattern and urban form that
promotes and legitimates current social and property
relations (see Blowers. 1980; Freestone. 1981; Knox
and Cullen. 1981; Kirk 1982; Fainstein and Fainstein.
1985; Feagin, 1984 and 1990; Harvey. 1989; Healey
et.al.. 1989; Dear. 1990; Fainstein. 1994). While adopting a political economy approach, the paper examines
aspects of community and development interests' participation in the planning process that facilitate this
role. In the tradition of this theoretical approach, this
examination explores the relationship between market
Irish Geography 28( I) (1995) 64-75. 007S-0078/95/S3.50
© Geographical Society of Ireland. Dublin.

based economies and democratically based politics as
they are revealed through participation within the
urban planning system. The political economy approach provides a comprehensive framework within
which to consider the broad implications of the social
power relations reflected within the planning system.
Moreover, it provides the conceptual basis for positioning the urban planning process as an integral pan
of the capitalist state apparatus.
Using local authority urban planning in Dublin as a
case study, the paper investigates the extent and effectiveness of community group and development interest input into the formulation of" planning policy. Its
primary aim is to examine how the nature of participation, the stage at which it occurs, and planners* reactions to it, create distinctive layers of" influence with
quite different capabilities of affecting policy formulation. The paper's finding thai developers' influence
is paramount in policy formulation is hardly groundbreaking. More significant is the identification of the
mechanisms through which the system of participa-
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tion operates to ensure the legitimacy of the planning
system while generating policy and practice that serve
the long term interests of capital.
By positioning urban planning within its broader
political framework, the paper also shows that development interests have a privileged position within the
planning system. Little formal participation is required by them to ensure that their interests are accounted for in policy decisions. Their political and
economic strength, ready access to political decision
makers, and an inherent acceptance of the legitimacy
of their demands create an uncontested and unrecognised bias that has become integral to the planning
decision making process. In short, their priorities implicitly underscore policy formulation.
Participation in the Urban Planning Process
The official rationale behind public participation is
thai it is a mechanism for transferring power from
government and bureaucracy to the community. The
need for participation in urban planning arose from the
broader demand for government accountability associated with 1960s radicalism and the decline of the
political consensus (Blowers. 1986). Requirements to
provide mechanisms for participation were incorporated into the planning legislation of the U.K. (1964)
and Ireland (1963). However, though public participation has been espoused in principle, its official interpretation has tended to be narrow and to be prefaced by
warnings against expending undue extra time or money
on its practice.
The practice of participation can vary from genuine
power sharing lo ineffective tokenism that serves
simply to pass information on lo ihe public on a
numberof pre-determined policy options (see Arnstein.
1969; Dennis, 1970; Young, 1985). Thornley (1977)
has identified a continuum of three approaches to
planning participation: radical, liberal and conservative, which create very different contexts for participation. At one extreme of the continuum is the radical
approach thai aims at making conflict explicit and
increasing awareness of unbalanced power relations
within planning. Radical theorists view participation
in ihe status quo as participation between unequal
partners. Inequalities must be dealt with if power is to
be equitably shared. So. participation is theorised as a
means lo alter society's power relations. As radical
participation requires delegation of power from the
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professional elites who control planning procedures it
has received little support from professional planners.
There is little likelihood that official planning exercises will espouse it. given the technocratic education
and socialisation process that planners undergo
(McLoughlin. 1992).
The liberal approach envisages the containment of
conflict through bargaining and institutionalisation.
Though conflict is not seen as fundamental it is accepted and considered to be manageable through concession. It is mediated through established institutions
to create orderly and controlled change. Participation
occurs within a set of discrete and limited rules. This
is reflected in the view, prevalent among planning
professionals, that the only realistic time to involve the
public in plan or policy making is after a limited range
of options has been clarified (Knox, 1994). The bureaucratic confines within which local authority planners operate tend to favour this model of participation.
At the other extreme of the continuum is the conservative approach which aims at establishing a consensus of values through participation, which maintains social order. Information is exchanged between
planners and participants and a chain of feed-back,
adaptation, and equilibrium is established. The exercise of participation is seen as a two-way information
exchange rather than power-sharing in decision-making. Policy is adapted to public opinion and attitudes
ratherthan being formed by them. Participation allows
for the ostensible sharing of authority but. to avoid
destabilising the status quo, authorities must be confident that issues are innocuous before they enter the
participation arena. The aim. Thornley (1977) claims,
is to empower a decision-making elite by ensuring
their legitimacy. This is achieved through the apparent
accountability provided by supplying an improved
quality of information to the public about pre-selected
(and innocuous) issues. These issues, because they are
visible, become the key issues for public discussion.
The Irish legislation of 1963 came equipped with
very generous provision for participation, aiming ostensibly at creating a democratic system of accountable decision-making. However, if Thornley's approaches to participation are considered as a continuum, this examination of participation in Dublin's
planning system reveals a practice that may be positioned closest to the conservative approach, with notable concessions to a liberal approach. Information
exchange and direction of participation into institu-
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tional channels take precedence over power sharing.
Planners" belief that the public's best interests are
genuinely served by planning's everyday operations
creates a tendency For them to accept only marginal
suggestions for change that are compatible with their
overall plans. The input of development and business
interests into policy information is distinguished from
that of the community (a) by planners" more positive
reaction to their input and (b) by their ease of access to
decision-making echelons beyond the planning department, e.g. at ministerial level. This input enters the
planning system and decision-making process at an
entirely different level to that of the community.
The following discussion elaborates on and demonstrates the validity of the claims made above. For those
unfamiliar with the Irish planning system. Figures 1
and 2 outline the policy formulation and development
control processes. These figures also clarify the role of
the key actors involved in these processes and highlight the formal opportunities for participation by
development and community interests.

Sources Used in the Formulation of Planning
Policy
Superficially at least, the factor that differentiates
between community and development interests' input
into the planning policy formulation is their access to
the planning department and to other relevant decision-making bodies. The existence of differential levels of access to planners is largely unacknowledged by
authorities. No distinction is made between the two
interests" input within the formal structures for participation. The failure to recognise this and its impact on
resulting planning outcomes ensures that the participation of many community groups will be entirely
ineffectual.
A useful starting point in quantifying the impact of
development and community interests' input is to
identify the sources used by planning officials in the
formulation of policy. This also helps to identify and
clarify the idea of distinctive layers of influence.
Discussion here is based on a series of indepth interviews carried out with Dublin planners, development
interests and community groups between 1988 and
1990. Of 30 planners interviewed. 27 were employees
of the three local authorities with jurisdiction over the
Dublin region and 3 were in private practice. The 23
developers interviewed represented a range of scales
from institutional developers to large scale development companies with international interests, to small
companies with purely local interests. All were primarily involved in the development of office space. The
29 community groups were chiefly resident action
groups based throughout Dublin city, its inner and
outer suburbs. However, some umbrella groups such
as An Taisce were also included. Responses to interview questions were grouped and are discussed here in
terms of percentages who gave particular responses.
Thus, categories are not mutually exclusive. Quotations from interviews are identified by a designated
code referring to whether the source was a planner (P).
developer (D) or community group (C) and to which
individual is quoted.
In the development of planning policy there is, of
course, a basis of technical information, population
projections, statistics and land-use surveys that serves
as a basic audit of service and facility needs. However,
the majority of planners (62%) specified informal
contacts as the major source used in policy formula-
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planner put it. "we do nothing except publicise the plan
display. The general requirements of developers are
expressed in the weight of planning applications and
appeals. Professional contact is largely informal. There
is very little formal contact"(P21). Such contact ranges
from casual suggestions made about development
plan policies at pie-application consultations, to the
other extreme described by a representative of the
Dublin Chamber of Commerce: "(Planners) are helpful and forthcoming. There is continuous dialogue. We
discuss problems and make suggestions. We are often
in sync with the planners* views. We have a special
viewing of the draft (planning policy) arranged. We
don*t have to object or appeal. We have a good, first
name relationship with the planners" (Dl).

| An Bord I'leanala

Pre-application
Figure 2: Participation in development control

lion, with 12°/< of these specifically stressing informal
professional contact. Less than a quarter (24%) mentioned formal contact with state or semi-state agencies
such as the Industrial Development Authority. Dublin
Bus or the Department of Education. Little weight
appears to be given to contact with community groups
at the initial policy formulation stage.
Submissions and the use of councillors were quite
strongly emphasised by planners (34% and 3 1 % respectively) as a source at this stage. However, the
submissions specified were not from the general public but from interest groups representing development
and business interests e.g. the Construction Industry
Federation and the Dublin Chamber of Commerce.
Only 14% of community groups had used councillors
in the attempt to influence initial policy formulation
(though fewer than half the groups in total (45%)
attempted to become involved at this stage). At this
point in the process, councillors appear to be used
chiefly to exert informal political pressure on planners
on behalf of the development lobby.
The emphasis placed on informal contact, casual
meetings, phone calls and letters is very significant.
Informal professional contact was the most frequently
cited form of contact overall. Such contact is often not
specifically aimed at the development plan and related
policy but involves the discussion of individual developments. Nonetheless it filters through to have an
indirect and vital impact on policy formulation. As one

Consultations

Perhaps the strongest evidence of development interests' informal leverage is found after the policy
formulation stage through the use of pre-application
consultations. Pre-application consultations between
planners and developers, besides being explicitly accommodative of development interests, are a major
source used by planners in piecing together the thrust
of developers" demands. Though they occur continually and are related to development control not policy,
policy is nonetheless clearly influenced by the ongoing feedback they provide.
There was unanimous approval of these consultations among planners and the majority of developers
(95%) regularly used them to discuss proposals prior
to applying for planning permission. The developers
outlined the content of these consultations as a "full
and frank discussion*"(D4) which is "necessary and
valuable, especially regarding cost and time'*(D6); "if
a developer finds that planners are totally opposed to
a development, they will hint as to what is acceptable"
(D22). Though rarely explicity termed 'negotiation*.
6 1 % of planners considered the process effectively to
be one of negotiation or bargaining; "we ask for 3x
expecting 2x. (The developer) offer(s) 1 x expecting to
give 2x. We split the difference"(PI6). The result is
that "developers know what would be in the planner's
mind before applying, so this helps their success
rate"(D22). The process described closely mirrors
Simmie and French's (1989) model of corporate participation: a reciprocal relationship in which an understanding based on unwritten rules governs how far
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each party can expect to push the other. No respondent
referred to the fact that this entire process takes place
before any opportunity is provided for public comment. This reflects the planners" view of themselves as
acting on behalf of the public interest in such cases.
The accommodation of private sector interests
through pre-application consultations is clearly accepted within the planning profession rather than being problematised, or even acknowledged, as the accommodation of a vested interest. This is ingrained in
decision-making agencies at both central and local
government level making it unnecessary for these
interests to be forcefully asserted at the policy-making
stage (Short el al., 1986). The vast majority of developers (74%) agreed that they could influence development policy. As one developer suggested, "slowly, by
constantly requiring the same thing we can put our
demands across"(D2); "by going to the planning department and making clear what our needs are. planners get to know"(D 1). Though development interests
express these views in pre-application consultations in
an individual capacity, their impact on planning authorities tends to be felt as a unified lobby. A clearly
defined and identifiable "developers' interest' exists,
by virtue of their common interests, which tends to be
more uniform than the diverse and parochial concerns
of community groups (Girling. 1982; Grist. 1983).
Their demands are shaped by conditions in the market.
The expectation that this will be built into planning
policy is continually reinforced among planning officials through numerous other channels also; local
representatives, politicians, lobbying by the Construction Industry Federation, the Construction Industry
Development Board, and bodies representing commercial interests (City Centre Business Association.
Chamber of Commerce etc).
The Strategic Importance of Development
Interests
Development interests hold a strategically vital position in development planning and policy. Without
their proposing development in accordance with policy
guidelines, planners have no means of policy implementation. Reflecting this, 79% of planners believed
that they could not implement policies promoting
development of a type, or in a location, thai departed
from the logic of the market; "we can offer till we are
blue in the face but we have to wait until the developer

wants to. We can create the climate but the market
decides. There is nothing in normal planning controls
that can force the market"(Pl). Failure to produce a
development plan in line with market criteria may
result in developers simply not implementing any
policies that are not agreed with; "developers have
influence by simply not developing if it does not suit,
so the planners get nothing done"(D6).
Theoretically, the developers' strategic position does
not affect which policies are formulated, but its influence on which policies can actually be implemented is
absolute. As one developer put it. "obviously, developers and business interests will be more influential.
We are consulted and listened to. We usually back
planners' opinions. We don't take the narrow view of
residents' associations. We are the only ones paying
rates. This has an effect on what planners listen to"
(Dl). Public participation is demoted in importance as,
obviously, the 'general public' plays little role in
implementing planning policy despite living with its
outcomes. Because of their strategic economic importance development interests effectively, if indirectly,
come close to being collaborative decision-makers on
policy formulation. This position is ensured through
informal, on-going communication allowing developers to keep in touch with prevailing attitudes in the
planning authority and (o tailor their dealings accordingly. Business interests are not so much expressed as
anticipated (Knox, 1994), so their influence is obscured. Policy is clearly conditioned by the political
context in which it is set. the strategic importance of
developers' investment capital and the need to adhere
to certain imperatives of capitalism (Healey el al.,
1989). An informal atmosphere promoting a prodevelopment ethos is created and can prove difficult lo
resist. Although this atmosphere is not explicit it
nevertheless infiltrates the entire planning system. As
one planner outlined: "there is a web of influence and
power which is very difficult to break through. An
environment for a decision is made which makes it
difficult for any other decision than the desired one to
be reached. A planning consultant makes a submission
for the client and gets in touch with the minister, who
contacts the manager, who contacts the senior administrator and the technical staff. If everyone is saying the
same thing, including the councillors, this creates the
environment. It is an informal ready-up. There is
nothing necessarily malicious nor is there personal
gain. It is a contextual thing. There is nobody there to
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put forward an alternative except the planner, who is
isolated. These informal ways never get into the publiclight. There are informal linkages leading to the desired decision. It is a power game in which you cannot
put forward a successful alternative. Planning tries to
raise other issues but never can"(P20).
This atmosphere is maintained by the strategic importance of development interests and is fuelled by the
informal contact network available to developers. A
variety of channels of communication, political connections and a knowledge of the system often facilitated by the use of private planning consultants, allows
development interests to sustain their privileged position. Simmie and French (1989) identified a 'permanent liaison' between planning departments and
corporatist interests, allowing them regular and unrestricted access to key planning officials. They stressed
informal contacts as the most important means of
mediating corporate interests. Community interests
rarely have such channels of communication open to
them, nor can they easily afford to engage the expertise
of professional planning consultants.
The Incontestable Basis of Policy
The privileged position of development interests is
reflected in the fact that 65% of developers did not
attempt to influence the development plan or policies
before its publication. This initial stage is the stage at
which suggestions and submissions are most likely to
be assimilated in a manner that could be formative to
policy rather than simply influencing subsequent adaptation of policy options. Development interests'
lack of involvement at this stage initially appears to be
contradictory until the question is raised of whether
they need to participate formally at this stage at all to
ensure that their inierests are considered. The range
and frequency of informal contact ensures that their
interests are in-built in the decision-making process.
Healey el al. (1989) assert that the needs of development are anticipated in draft policies put forward for
consideration in a development plan. This is the 'prepolitics processing' of policy options (Roweis. 1981).
Public debate around these policies, and potential
change, can only take place within the bounds of the
original policies forwarded by the planning department. An 'incontestable basis' (Healey el al., 1989)
accounting for the needs of the development industry
is automatically written into policies and included in
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decision-making criteria, ensuring that continued advantage is conferred on capital. Certain options that do
not accord with dominant priorities are thus excluded
early on (Dunleavy, 1980; Young 1985). Public inputs
are only seriously considered after this process has
occurred, ensuring that debate is confined to innocuous issues that do not question the legitimacy of
development interests. Though the policy package
may be altered, the contents remain substantially unchanged. There is an underlying value consensus within
(and beyond) the planning department which seeks to
promote, facilitate and not unduly restrict development. This also means that accepting the general thrust
(if not the specifics) of development interests demands
is perceived as a neutral rather than an explicitly
political stance.
The large majority of developers (74%) had attempted to have some input into development policies
after the draft review had been published. Nearly half
of these (48%) stressed professional contact again as
the major opportunity fordoing so; "formal and informal letters and chats, ... professional contacts and
phone calls" (D2). These informal chats are doubly
facilitated by planners'willingness to incorporate them
and by developers' use of professional planning expertise in addressing planning issues.
Thus, an accumulation of effective forms of input by
or on behalf of development interest can be identified.
These sources are largely informal and exist at various
stages in the planning process yet, combined, they
create persuasive feedback to the policy formulation
stage. This constitutes the primary layer of influence.
The input of the community constitutes a secondary
layerof influence that is superimposed upon the policy
basis emerging from the pre-existing and continuous
inputs of the primary layer. The lack of clarity about
who controls decisions and resources and about the
location of power allows those interests with professional and political knowledge to dominate. Simultaneously it obscures the process that produces this bias
and so maintains legitimacy. The end result is that
developers' interests can become the non-negotiable
basis of local authority policy, so they do not need to
be strongly reasserted at public forums when the stage
of open public participation arrives.
There is strong evidence that these power relations
are reinforced through informal pro-development political pressure, placed on the planning department by
politicians at every level from the ministerial to the
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local. This was acknowledged as being influential by
80% of planners, 70% of developers and 85% of
community groups (for further discussion, see
McGuirk. 1994). In a practice which is theoretically
neutral and carried out at a local level, pro-development political influence limits the effectiveness of
community participation. There is no equivalent source
of political lobbying that can address the diffuse and
variable demands and interests of 'the community* or
the "public interest': both ill-defined terms that obscure as much as they reveal.

Academics
The
public
Residents/tenants
associations
Property
professions
Business
interests

Community Groups* Involvement in Policy
Matters
A comparison with community groups' involvement in policy matters highlights how theirexperience
differs from that of development interests. A surprisingly high proportion of groups had attempted to
participate in policy formulation (57%). However,
what was classified as an attempt to influence policy
may simply mean a letter submitted to the planning
department complaining about a specific problem in
the locality rather than addressing a problem in the
published policy review document. Later discussion
indicates that such submissions tend to be left aside,
considered to be too parochial to be relevant to policy
issues. Revealingly. 79% of community groups had
never been in direct contact with planning officials to
discuss policy prior to the publication of a draft policy
review. Most were unaware of the review until the
draft's publication. More than half (55%) had never
been in contact on policy matters even after its publication.
Significantly, when planners were asked to rank
various actors in terms of their influence on policy
formulation, 'development interests' and 'business
interests' both received mean ranks above those given
to either 'the public' or to 'residents' and tenants'
associations' reflecting the effectiveness of informal
contact (Figure 3). The mean score awarded to 'the
public' was above that only of 'academics', giving
some indication of the weakness of public input at this
stage.
The planners pointed out that (he high score awarded
to council members related to their ability to veto the
plan and its policies. More light can be shed on their
apparent role if community groups' perspectives on
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Figure 3: Average rank of perceived influences on plan
formation
how exactly councillors are useful to them is examined. In total. 90% of community groups had utilised
councillors at some stage in their participation, though
this was chiefly when dealing with a specific development application. Komito (1983) has questioned the
representativeness of councillors in Ireland and is
supported by a vast international literature raising
similar doubts (Dennis. 1972; Rakove, 1975; Newton,
1976; Young 1985; Short el al. 1986; Hampton,
1987). Moreover, only 14% of community groups had
used councillors at the critical initial stages of policy
formulation. The key role that they play for community groups is merely one of facilitating access to the
planning department and extracting information otherwise difficult to obtain; "(we use them) to get infor-
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mation planners are reluctant to give..." (C3I), "they
get information the Corporation won't give us"(C5),
"they're invaluable in knowing what door to
approach"(CI4), "we only got a meeting after three
letters were ignored. Then (the local T.D. and councillor) got us one within ten minutes"(C28). Many of the
groups liked to have backing and advice from a councillororT.D. on approaching (he planning department;
"all things are easier with a councillor. They found the
right route for us to take. They got us to apply to
departments we didn't even know existed"(C 17). Most
groups did not refer to the outcome of participation
mediated by a councillor but seemed satisfied once
contact with the planning department was achieved.
This illustrates the therapeutic effect of participation
(Cullen. 1980). If a situation satisfies people, social
harmony is maintained regardless of whether concrete
change is achieved (Reade. 1987). This "therapy' can
diffuse and channel dissatisfaction into less threatening modes by offering a certain amount of restricted
contact with planning officials. Once contact is established, groups become wary of endangering it. Expectations become confined to the definition of what is
possible, which in turn shapes community groups'
activities (Newton. 1976; Kirk. 1980).
The stage at which community participation takes
place, and the attention paid to it, are vital concerns in
the analysis of policy formulation. Understanding the
timing and treatment of public input compared to that
of development interests reveals the legitimising function of public participation. It also further exposes how
an incontestable policy basis is formed subject only to
marginal public scrutiny.

the 'bigger' structural issues of the planning system
and the tendency to defend a community's own 'turf",
letting other communities do likewise.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that early involvement in policy formulation is rare. Meeting with residents' associations' representatives after publication
of the policy document was mentioned by 46% of
planners as the primary source of contact with the
public. These meetings aspire to explain policies,
present information about their aims and get feedback:
usually an immediate gauging of public reaction. Although these formal meetings took place at loo late a
stage for formative and positive input into policy, they
seem to defuse demand for public input quite successfully. As one planner put it "there is ... a sense of the
general confession about it. It is therapeutic. We go
through their worries with them and they have a name
for the faces they see"(P6). Another called it an "opportunity for them to let off steam"(P5) which he
claimed has a defusing effect. The value of these
meetings lies more in their 'safety valve' role than in
their contribution to meaningful participaiion. They
can end up being what one planner called "explanatory
seminars"(P10). Nevertheless, the public demand for
a voice is met as the majority of groups concern
T

Dealing with local
planning applications
Maintaining a coherent
community
Impact of roads
on local area

Planners' Contact with the General Public
The restriction of community policy input is far
from a simple matter of the community's lack ol
strategic positioning. The timing of their input and
how planners then address their input both play important roles in confining them to the secondary layer.
Moreover, most community groups concentrate their
efforts on dealing with specific localised problems, not
with policy issues (Grist, 1983) (Figure4). This results
from a combination of factors related to the perceived
abstract nature of strategic planning, the difficulty of
sustaining community interest in planning policies
whose impacts are neither immediate nor obvious,
perceptions of powerlessness in addressing some of
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themselves not with policy issues but with more localised place-based issues. The essential purpose of legitimation is served - the planning system is justified
by appearing to serve the public (Thomas. 1976; Katz,
1989; Burns, 1990; Fainstein, 1990).
Furthermore, one third of planners (31%) listed
objections, appeals, or oral hearings as the main source
of contact with the public. All of these relate to specific
developments and have no immediate impact upon
policy formulation. Because they occur at an advanced
stage in the planning process (Figure 2) the nature of
public participation is shaped into negative objecting
rather than constructive contribution to planning matters. The timing of opportunities for participation, the
formal nature of these opportunities and the enforced
negative stance they impose on community groups
shapes planners' attitudes towards their input and
confines them to a secondary layer of influence.
Given the lack of opportunities for informal contact
with planners, community groups rely on formal contact. Using these channels of communication requires
them to adopt certain forms of articulation that demand
what Dearlove (1973) defined as middle class skills.
These formal channels set the agenda and determine
the parameters of what can be discussed by presenting
pre-set policy options. They determine what is negotiable and what constitutes a problem. Planners' own
interpretation of what the public wants is imposed on
public feedback (Fagence. 1977). Resulting adaptation to policy is mediated through established institutions. Concessions granted are yielded along lines
defined by planners' interpretations. Ultimately, conII ict is managed to create orderly and controlled change
wiihin pre-established parameters. Participation of
this nature can clearly be positioned along the continuum between Thornley's conservative and liberal
approaches.
Planners' Perceptions of Public

Participation

Planners' attitudes towards public participation are
important because they determine the extent to which
public input will be taken into account. In general,
attitudes were not positive. Members of the publicwere referred to as "request machines" (PI), and as
"pests"(P15) who tend to "mix everything and every
department up"(P3), "they expect planning to influence what it cannot. They are not aware of what a
planner does or can d o " (P4). Almost three-fifths of the

planners (57%) referred to problems of the public
being uninterested and/or being unable to understand
issues involved with general policy, though one planner conceded that "(planners) are expert enough to
make (planning) complex enough for the average
person not to understand"!P24). There is a marked
proclivity to use 'competence' as the criterion to merit
participation. Planners' belief that the public is uninformed about planning issues, unaware of how the
system works and uninterested in its wider implications, is a crucial influence on how they react to public
involvement (Fagence. 1977; Dunleavy and O'Leary,
1987). These beliefs mean that contact between the
two becomes what one planner called "an information
gathering exercise with no real exchange of
information"!P1). Residents' Associations were referred to as "people with their own ideas for what they
need in an area and no wider idea of how things have
to develop for a city to keep working"* PI );"they do not
give views that help in the formulation of policy") P10).
"most only perceive their own patch"(P15). Many
groups are not motivated to participate until the implications of a policy begin to have effects on their
neighbourhoods. It is in the nature of area based
community groups to be primarily interested in matters viewed as parochial by policy makers. The usevalues they apply to their localities are at odds with the
exchange-values applied by capital. Places of value to
local communities as their 'turf" are not part of the
conventional concept of commodity applied to place
as 'space' by developers (Molotch and Logan. 1987).
The predominantly local focus places community
groups in an inferior position in any conflict with
planners and developers. This is due on the one hand
to the dominant criteria of development interests, and
on the other hand to planners' limited approach to
participation.
Adaptation to policy sought on the basis of 'parochial' concerns are neither orderly nor controlled and
therefore are at odds with a conservative/liberal approach to public participation. As a result, participants' views are taken into account, as legislation
demands they must be. but then subsumed and lost
within the broader policy directions of the 'public
interest'. Planners have perceived themselves to represent a consensual public interest that can surpass the
array of divisive, sectional and parochial interests of
the community at large; "we live in the city do we not.
We see the problems. Anyone making representations
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has a particular interest to push. They do not have a
balanced view. Planners know what is going on from
day to day contact" (PI9). As one planner frankly
stated; "we are employed to do the job for the public.
(Participation) is like buying a dog and barking yourself (P19). The community is clearly made up of a
variety of conflicting interests and class positions,
some of which are irreconcilable. There is no 'general
public' but a series of public, sectional interests, and
social strata, some of which have influence and power
and some of which are isolated and fragmentary. Such
a 'public interest' approach collapses public diversity
of opinion and attempts to contain it within manageable categories. Public proposals can be redefined on
planners" terms and non-conforming aspects can be
by-passed. Planners decide how much time to allot to
the official channels of participation, whether to ignore the opinions presented, and how to balance them
against the opinions of development and business
interests, without whom the authority's plans will not
be implemented. Community input is channelled
through formal conduits that are thoroughly managed
and do not compare with development interests' informal but effective leverage.
Problems such as these reflect poorly on community
groups' chances of meaningful participation and
broaden the gulf between the primary and secondary
layers of influence. This is a function of the pluralist
notion upon which planning is founded (Dear and
Clark. 1981b). This notion promotes the treatment of
all groups as if they had an equal voice and fails to
recognise varying degrees of access to decision-making forums in planning (Long, 1975; Simmie, 1985;
Duncan el«/.. 1988). Once the opportunity for participation is provided, it is assumed that development
interests and community groups are equally enabled to
voice their opinion and make themselves heard. While
the planning system may be overtly pluralist, the
assumed pluralist politics, open and equitable debate is
simply not the basis on which planning participation
operates. Common pluralist assumptions fail to recognise that the economic power base extends to affect the
control of and access to the political power base.
Nevertheless, when asked whether the varying resources available to groups made a difference to their
ability to participate effectively, 93% of the planners
acknowledged that it did. Thirty nine per cent recognised the importance of engaging professional help if
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attempting to oppose a development proposal; "developers will employ professionals. If people want to
oppose development they will normally need to employ professional expertise" (PI8). Indeed, the fact
that 93% of community groups had utilised professional help in their dealings with the planning department suggests that they too are very well aware of their
importance: "we just wouldn't be able to do it without
professional help. On an appeal particularly, it's absolutely vital. We just couldn't afford what a developer
can. You feel you just don't make an impression.
When your group is run just on voluntary effort you get
tired" (C32), "help is vital, we couldn't manage without it. Planners just sleep if (our input) is not in their
language. They perk up once they hear professional
language" (C32). 11 follows that a simple increase in
the opportunity to participate through existing means
does not equalise rates of participation across community groups (Verba and Nie, 1972). Many groups
struggle to meet the standard of input demanded to be
effective; many others are simply discouraged entirely
from participating.
Despite planners' recognition of the uneven nature
of community input, only two of those interviewed
reconised that this unevenness meant that planners'
perception of community demands must be unrepresentative. The belief that planners speak for the public
interest appears to obscure this connection for most
planners. So, their perception of community demands
is based on feedback gained from partial publ ic participation. This feedback is interpreted according to the
pre-conceived notions and values of planners, and
applied to a set of policy options that are already
determined according to the long term interests of
development capital. The notion of an incontestable
basis underlying policy formation is never
problematised.
Conclusion

By examining the policy making stages of the planning process it becomes apparent that there are distinctive layers of influence that impinge to different extents on shaping policy. The examination of Dublin's
case suggests the existence of distinctive channels
through which this influence is transmitted; some
formal and restricted to more manageable stages, some
informal and on-going with a more pervasive influ-

McGuirk
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ence. The primary layer is dominated by economically
and politically strong development and business interests. This stems from informal, continuous input and is
supported by an implicit acceptance of the legitimacy
of facilitating development. To a considerable extent
the existence of this layer negates the need for these
interests to utilise formal participatory channels. The
need to facilitate the requirements of development
interests at policy level is intensified by current economic circumstances and. in Dublin's case, the urgent
need to attract development investment (M'Guirk.
1994). This layer of influence is crucial in shaping the
ultimate parameters of policy options. Ii is decisive in
producing policy's incontestable basis which determines the climate for specific decision-making. Such
a policy and decision-making climate is ultimately
reified in urban form.
The secondary layer, which applies to community
influence, is transmitted through formal channels and
confined to dealing with a pre-determined set of options. Scope for adaptation of policy exists within this
set but the opportunity to influence basic policy thrusts,
determined within the primary layer of influence, is
foregone. Community groups are involved at a stage
and in a manner that confines their influence to the
secondary layer. Such participation amounts to what
Thomley (1977) has identified as a conservative approach which ensures a bias in the information received by planning authorities, and in the manner in
which that information is incorporated (Healey et <il..
1989). Combined with planners' assumed role as defenders of the public interest, this allows the priorities

of development interests with access to the primary
layer to permeate and to persist in emerging policy.
These priorities remain unchallenged as the political
tensions that arise from the conflict between use value
and exchange value ("space' as commodity and 'place'
as locality) is diverted into the unthreatening and more
orderly channels of formal participation at later stages
in the planning process (Fincher. 1981). The persistent
failure of planners to recognise the incontestable basis
and the pluralist assumptions underlying community
participation ensures that it remains unchallenged.
Though the contribution of public participation to the
production of democratic plans is a primary source of
legitimacy for planning (M c Auslan. 1980: Ravetz.
1980: Dear 1986). community impact on the fundamental premises of policy matters remains largely
peripheral. Thus legitimised, urban planning outcomes
continue to play a critical role within the state apparatus. Potential crises emanating from the (il (logic of the
development process are averted and the current configuration of property relations is sustained and legitimised. When urban planning is analysed from a political economy stance which positions it within the
framework of capitalist economic and political structures, the limits to participation and the purpose served
by its limitation are crystallised.
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